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Abstract
This paper tests the presence of balance sheets effects and analyzes the impli-
cations for exchange rate policies in emerging markets. The results reveal that the
emerging market bond index (EMBI) is negatively related to the banks. foreign
currency leverage, and that these banks. foreign currency exposures are relatively
unhedged. Panel SVAR methods using EMBI instead of advanced country lend-
ing rates find, contrary to the literature, that the amplitude of output responses to
foreign interest rate shocks are smaller under relatively fixed regimes. The find-
ings are robust to the local projections method of obtaining impulse responses,
using country specific and GARCH-SVAR models.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E44, F31, F41
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
With the globalization of capital markets, emerging market economies have relied more on foreign 
finance and their economies have become vulnerable to sudden outflows of capital.1
Financial crises related to abrupt exchange rate movements in emerging markets have either been 
caused or aggravated by excess unhedged foreign currency liabilities of the banking sector in these 
countries. More specifically, foreign currency leverage measured by net foreign liabilities over net worth 
of these banks in crisis countries has been quite high.  
Table 1 reports the change in exchange rates and real GDP for the period before and after the crises 
together with the foreign currency leverage of the banking sector for countries that have had financial 
crisis, and countries that have financial and trade linkages with these countries. The important 
observation is that in most of the cases large depreciations coupled with high bank leverage have caused 
a decline in output and countries that have banking sectors with low or negative leverage like Uruguay, 
Philippines, Vietnam and Panama have recorded an increase in output after the crises. 
Balance sheet approach literature has formalized these concepts after Krugman’s (1999) criticism of 
the existing bank run and currency crisis models. The author has argued that any viable model has to 
incorporate the balance sheet effects and financial fragility to explain currency and banking crises and 
blames the failure of first and second generation models to represent the causes of the Asian Financial 
Crisis on the lack of these mechanisms. 
Chang and Velasco (1998) have included balance sheet effects into a Diamond-Dybvig framework to 
analyze the outcomes of different exchange rate regimes in a multiple equilibrium model. Similar 
research was conducted by Aghion, Bachetta, Banerjee (2000), Burnside Eichenbaum, Rebello (1999) 
and Chang Velasco, Cespedes (2001) in a small open economy DSGE setting. This line of research 
identifies two opposing effects of changes in real exchange rates. The more common wisdom 
observation is that flexible regimes are better absorbers of external shocks and central banks involuntary 
 
1 Figure 1 shows the increasing importance of foreign finance for emerging market economies over the years. The ratio in the 
graph denotes a weighted average of 30 emerging market economies’ ratios.  
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interest rate adjustments under fixed regimes exacerbate the effects of external shocks. In light of the 
work on balance sheet effects a more recent explanation is that emerging markets with high unhedged 
foreign denominated liabilities are vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations. There is a consensus in the 
literature that the former effect dominates and flexible regimes are superior in terms of output volatility 
when the economy faces external shocks.  
Despite the growing amount of theoretical work formalizing balance sheet effects, there is no 
empirical research that studies the existence of balance sheet effects and it’s implication for exchange 
rate policies. The only relevant paper found was by Berganza, Chang and Herrero (BCH) (2003) who 
work with annual data and find that foreign debt stock together with unexpected depreciations are 
affective in explaining the changes in Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) which is a proxy for 
foreign interest rates.  
This paper empirically analyzes balance sheets effects and answers the following three questions. Do 
foreign creditors demand different interest rates or adjust the share of their portfolio allocated to an 
emerging market country, depending on the strength of banking sector balance sheets in that country? 
To what degree do domestic banks hedge their foreign currency exposures and hence are affected by 
exchange rate fluctuations? How is the real sector affected by foreign interest rate shocks under different 
exchange rate regimes in the presence of balance sheet effects? 
I study the first question using a panel data fixed effects model with two different proxies for foreign 
interest rates2, and find that there is a positive leverage, interest rate relationship.  More specifically, 
foreign creditors have increased (decreased) their interest rates when the domestic banks increased 
(decreased) their net foreign liabilities relative to their net worth. This finding has two important 
implications. One is that foreign interest rates that are assumed to be exogenous in small open economy 
models do actually depend on bank balance sheets which in turn are affected by the macroeconomic 
developments in the country. Second, given that foreign interest rates are partially endogenous, the 
 
2 EMBI and S&P credit ratings. 
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strength of bank balance sheets and thus central bank exchange rate policy becomes more important 
compared to a framework not including these effects. 
Even if banks have significant foreign currency leverage, if they hedge their exposures, detrimental 
effects of exchange rate depreciations would be limited. First, I estimate the effects of exchange rate 
movements on the banking sector stock market index net of their effects on the non-bank market index. 
Next, using balance sheet data, I construct a measure, which captures returns to bank capital, and I 
analyze the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on this variable. Results imply that developing country 
banks are relatively unhedged in terms of foreign currency compared to developed country counterparts.  
Finally, I consider the effect of exchange rate policy on output within the framework of balance sheet 
effects by analyzing the impulse responses from a VAR model. The novelty in this section is to 
represent foreign interest rates by the EMBI3 or net foreign liability/total assets ratio4. Panel Structural 
Vector Autoregressive (PSVAR) and country specific analysis yield results that contradict the 
conventional wisdom. I find that output volatility is smaller under tight exchange rate policies when a 
country faces foreign interest rate shocks. Pure float regimes are unfavorable in this setting since the 
deprecation of exchange rates following external shocks inflates the domestic currency value of foreign 
liabilities, and increases foreign interest rates further. It is important to note here that I omit crisis 
periods for the countries that have been affected to avoid stacking the odds against flexible regimes.  
Following the literature I compare the results with the model including a weighted average of 
developed country lending rates instead of EMBI and find no significant difference between the two 
regimes in terms of the output response.  I also test if the exchange rate uncertainty is greater with 
relatively more flexible regimes and if amplitude of the output response to external shocks is larger 
under these regimes when I include this uncertainty in the model. Following the methodology of Jorda 
 
3 Emerging Market Bond Spread is equal to EMBI – return on US bonds of similar maturity. Hence, EMBI is equal to foreign interest rates 
plus the country spread. In this paper when I refer to foreign interest rates, I mean EMBI since these are the rates at which emerging market 
countries can borrow abroad. 
4 The literature comparing exchange rate regimes using VARs mostly assume that foreign interest rates are some weighted average of G-7 
country interest rates. 
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and Salyer (2003), I use a SVAR-GARCH model and incorporate conditional exchange rate standard 
deviations to compare the performance of the two exchange rate regimes and find that the difference in 
output response between the two is amplified, implying greater sensitivity of the domestic economy to 
external shocks, with a flexible regime.  
Finally, I check the robustness of the VAR results by using the local projections method, and find that 
the results hold. Local projections method has been recently introduced by Jorda (2004) as an alternative 
to VARs due to their poor long run forecast performance, and consists of iterative forecasting at 
different horizons to obtain impulse responses. 
The results imply that monitoring the balance sheet of banks becomes essential given that foreigners’ 
perception of risk depends on the financial health of the country. Flexible regimes, amplify the effects of 
foreign interest rate shocks by allowing banks’ net foreign liabilities to fluctuate with the exchange rate. 
These balance sheet effects dominate the negative effects of the lack of independent monetary policy 
under fixed regimes.  
These results should not be interpreted as a case for fixed exchange rate regimes. The vulnerability of 
these regimes to speculative attacks has been proven over and over again. Rather the excess volatility 
stemming from external shocks under flexible regimes offers a possible explanation for the fear of 
floating5 observed in these countries. 
Part 2 analyses the relationship between bank balance sheets and foreign interest rates, Part 3 measures 
the degree of foreign exchange exposure of emerging market banks, Part 4 compares the performance of 
different exchange rate regimes in terms of output volatility within the balance sheet approach 
framework and Part 5 concludes. 
Besides the BCH paper I could not find a relevant paper for part 2. Other than that a brief summary of 
the literature on measuring foreign currency exposure and the choice of exchange rate regimes in 
emerging markets is provided in parts 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
5 See Calvo Reinhart (2000) 
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2. Foreign Interest Rates and Leverage Relationship, Simple Regression Analysis 
This part tests if foreign currency leverage of the domestic banks affects foreign interest rates faced by 
the economy using different specifications. The variables that mimic foreign interest rates are, the 
emerging market bond index (EMBI) and the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings.  
EMBI is a widely used proxy for external cost of credit in the literature and is constructed by 
subtracting total returns on US Treasury bonds from a country’s EMBI return. The index tracks the total 
returns to external currency denominated debt instruments of the emerging markets including sovereign 
bonds issued by governments as well as fixed income securities issued by public and private companies. 
S&P credit rating on the other hand takes into account the credit worthiness of guarantors and their 
capacity to meet their commitment on the obligation. 
Due to data limitations, EMBI+ index and the S&P ratings are compiled for 21 emerging market 
countries6 for the 1998-2004 period and quarterly data are analyzed. The countries included along with 
the S&P credit rating definitions are provided in appendix 1.  
Regression results are depicted in table 2. The explanations for the independent variables in these 
regression equations are given in appendix 2. Tables 2a through 2c show the results from the regressions 
of EMBI and S&P7 credit ratings on the net worth/GDP and net foreign liability/GDP ratios controlling 
for some macroeconomic variables as well as the global EMBI. To avoid causality problems the lags of 
the net worth/GDP and the net foreign liability/GDP ratios are used as instruments.8
Overall the main finding points to a positive relationship between foreign currency leverage and 
foreign interest rates. This observation is robust to different dependent variables, different models and 
different lag lengths.  
 
6 JP Morgan EMBI covers 31 emerging market countries. Some of these countries were left out due to the  unavailability of some control 
variables on a quarterly basis. This omission does not decrease the power of the EMBI regression very much since bond index data of most 
of the countries left out are missing.  
7 S&P regression is based on a count data model since the credit ratings are discrete categories. 
8 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests failed to find a unit root for all the variables in the regression. Hence, all the variables are in 
levels. 
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The negative sign of the net worth coefficients and the positive sign of the net foreign liabilities 
coefficients for the EMBI regressions indicate that as countries rely more on foreign finance given a 
certain amount of net worth, the spread needed to attract this extra capital increases. This claim is also 
supported by a model including cross section fixed effects as shown in columns 4 and 5 of table 2a.  
Since EMBI is in terms of basis points, the coefficients of net worth and net foreign liability indicate 
the basis points increase in EMBI in response to a 100 percent increase in the net worth or net foreign 
liability, GDP ratio. For instance, the value of 298.7 represents the expected increase in EMBI stemming 
from a 100 percent increase in net foreign liabilities, GDP ratio. Other than the leverage variables, all the 
control variables have the expected signs and EMBI exhibits high serial correlation. 
S&P regression coefficients on the other hand can be interpreted as the probability of switching from 
one category to another. For example the -0.4 value for the net foreign liability coefficient in table 2b 
indicates that if net foreign liabilities/GDP ratio doubles holding everything else constant, there is a 40% 
chance that the credit rating of that country will be downgraded. Once again the positive coefficient on 
net worth and negative coefficient on net foreign liabilities implies a positive leverage, foreign interest 
rate relationship. S&P publishes credit ratings based on the ability to pay back domestic currency 
denominated debt as well as foreign currency denominated debt. Table2c illustrates the results from the 
regression using domestic currency ratings and finds similar results.  
Other than the leverage, foreign interest rate relationship, there are two other salient observations 
regarding the S&P regression results. First one is that the coefficients of all the independent variables 
are larger and more significant in the long term9 which implies that as data becomes more available in 
the long run, the fundamental variables in the economy have a greater impact on foreign interest rates. 
Second, the global emerging market bond index which measures the creditors risk perception towards 
emerging market countries is highly significant. This implies that there is a portfolio effect and that 
capital flows out of these countries when there is an adverse development in a single country. 
 
9 Short term ratings are assigned to those obligations considered short term in the relevant market. In U.S. short term obligation has a 
maturity date less than a year. 
3. Estimating the Degree of Hedging in Emerging Markets 
In the previous section, I showed evidence supporting the relationship between terms of foreign 
finance and balance sheets of domestic banks. Despite this relationship if domestic banks sufficiently 
hedge their foreign currency exposure using off balance sheet items, monetary policy which affects 
exchange rate volatility would have limited impact on bank balance sheets and foreign interest rates. 
More specifically the translation exposure10  of banks would be eliminated and economic exposure 
would be the only source of risk remaining.  
I measure the degree of hedging in emerging markets using two methods. First, I look at stock market 
data and then the balance sheets of the banking sector, to measure the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations on banks’ stock returns and returns to bank capital respectively. Latter measure is included 
to account for the fact that stock prices are being less and less determined by earnings and asset base 
especially in these economies. 
The objective of this paper is to determine the effect of exchange rate regimes on the real sector in 
emerging markets. In this respect measuring the degree of hedging is essential in assessing the need for 
central bank foreign exchange market intervention. The basic model used follows Jorion (1990), and is 
as follows: 
( ) ttitFtMiitFti ERRRRR εβββ +Δ+−+=− ,2,,,1,0,,                    (1) 
tMti RR ,, , ,  ,  are the returns on the ith firm, the market and the risk free rate, and change in the 
trade weighted exchange rate. In this model coefficient 
tFR , tERΔ
t,2β  captures the effect of a change in the 
exchange rate on the market value of the firm controlling for the changes in the market index. I measure 
the degree of hedging by using banking sector index for  and using non bank market index for . 
The reason for excluding the banking sector from the market index is to avoid a causality problem.  
tiR , tMR ,
The advantage of this method is that it accounts for the possibility that while foreign borrowing may 
be done through a fewer number of banks; the rest of the economy does not have foreign exchange 
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10 Refers to the effect of an unanticipated change in exchange rates on the consolidated financial reports of domestic banks. 
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exposure. Hence, the findings of the commonplace method that associates the proportion of firms that 
have significant exposure with the degree of hedging might be inaccurate in such countries.  
There are two issues pertaining to equation (1) and the analysis in this section. One is that as volume 
of trade and capital movements increased drastically over the past 20 years, derivative markets and the 
tools to avoid exchange rate risks have also increased in variety and in volume. Therefore a time series 
analysis that spans over the past couple of decades has to take account of these changes.  
Second problem with measuring foreign exchange exposure by determining the response of firm value 
to exchange rate fluctuations is that one needs to isolate the effects of monetary policy. For example an 
expansionary monetary policy which tends to inflate the exchange rate and the market value of the firm 
at the same time overshadows the detrimental effect of the depreciation on the balance sheet of a bank 
with positive net foreign liabilities. Including the non-bank market rate of return as an independent 
variable in equation (1) takes account of this factor together with other macroeconomic changes that 
affect exchange rates and rates of return simultaneously.  
The analysis in this section contributes to the literature on three grounds. One is the emphasis on the 
exposure of emerging market countries as a whole versus individual banks. Second is measuring 
exposure in the period following the Asian financial crisis. Third is the utilization of balance sheet data 
to measure foreign exchange exposure. 
3.1 Related Literature 
The great majority of the literature on foreign exchange exposure focuses on multinational firms of 
developed countries. The common finding in most of this literature is that the exposure is insignificant. 
Jorion (1990) in his pioneering work studies the exchange rate exposure of 287 US firms for the 1971-
1981 period and finds that only 15 of these firms have significant exposure, and that exposure is 
positively correlated with foreign involvement. A sectoral analysis by Bodnar and Gentry (1993) for 
Japan, Canada and US reports the insignificance of exposure in many industries but similar to Jorion 
points to the positive correlation between degree of openness and exposure. Griffin and Stulz (2001) 
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look at US, Canada, UK, France and Germany to measure the impact of competitive devaluations on the 
returns to firms and find that these devaluations do not provide an advantage to these firms 
The foreign exchange exposure of emerging markets has gathered more attention after the crises in 
1990’s. The results from the small number of research in this area are mixed.  In a paper similar to the 
analysis in this section, Kho and Stulz (1999) find that the currency crisis in Asia did not cause problems 
for the banks with large foreign exchange exposure vis-à-vis the market except for Indonesia and 
Philippines. The analysis conducted in this paper differs from this study by also considering non crisis 
periods11. On the other hand, Dominguez and Tesar (2001) find that Chile and Thailand have significant 
exposure from 1980 to 1999. Similarly, Parsley and Popper (2002) show that East Asian firms have been 
exposed to fluctuations in the US dollar, Mark and Yen. Highly relevant to the main theme in my 
analysis Parsley and Popper study the importance of different exchange regimes for East Asian firm 
exposure and find that exposure is more wide spread than industrialized economies and the number of 
firms with significant exposure is larger under pegged regimes compared to non pegged.  
Except for the Kho, Stulz paper, all of the above studies identify the degree of exposure in a country 
with the overall ratio of firms that are exposed. This methodology can be misleading if majority of the 
foreign currency denominated borrowing in a country is by a small number of firms12.  
3.2 Data, Methodology and Results 
The first experiment uses quarterly data of 10 emerging market and 10 developed countries from the 
IFS database. Sample period is 1998 to 2004. A list of these countries along with the explanation of the 
variables is provided in appendix 3. Not all the 21 emerging market countries listed in the JP Morgan 
EMBI index were included due to data unavailability. Income per capita and the concern for a more 
even distribution of economy size lead to the choice of the developed countries. The equation estimated 
is as follows, 
 
11 Kho and Stulz(1999) analysis uses the market index as a control variable. I use the non-bank market index to avoid a 
possible causality problem.  
12 See Sachs , Schwab and Woo (2000) for a discussion of high bank share of foreign denominated debt for  Asian economies. 
ttt DummiesCrisisEffectsFixedEntityVariablesControlERROR εβ ++++Δ= 1 13                        (2) 
where  is the rate of return on bank assets, and is calculated as follows: tROR
( )
)1(
)1(
−
−−=
Assets
WorthNetWorthNetRORt                             (3) 
tERΔ  is the change in exchange rate over the previous quarter. Exchange rate in this setting refers to 
an equally weighted average of Dollar, Yen and Pound’s value in terms of the national currencies14. The 
common consensus in the recent research is that having a weighted average of exchange rates leads to an 
underestimation of exchange rate exposure. This in turn stacks the odds against finding significant 
exposure or a significant 1β  coefficient in equation (2). 
Country specific effects are controlled by including dummy variables and allowing for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity15.  Also included are dummies for the 1994 Mexico, 1997 Asian, 1998 Brazil and 
2001 Turkish, Argentina crises. 
The control variables along with the results are displayed in table 3a. Growth rate of GDP and 
inflation is included to control for simultaneous effects of monetary policies on exchange rates and 
return on assets and other developments that affect the performance of the banking sector.  Also 
included are the banking sector balance sheet variables such as claim on government and private assets, 
liquidity of the banks measured by the bank reserves, bank assets ratio and the bank net foreign 
liability/bank assets ratio. The latter ratio is included since a banking sector that is sufficiently hedged in 
relative terms but has a large open foreign currency position can still be vulnerable to the fluctuations in 
the exchange rate.  
The results show that the banking sectors of the emerging market economies considered have been 
significantly affected by the fluctuations of the exchange rate. According to the model, a devaluation of 
1 percent has lead to a decrease in returns to assets of 0.067 percent. Developed countries over the same 
sample period were not affected significantly.  
                                                 
13 I obtained similar results using the lag of exchange rate variable as an instrument. 
14 Due to the unavailability of trade weighted average, equal weights have been used.  
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15 The method employed is 2-Step FGLS. 
The second experiment conducted uses stock market data from the Global Financial Data (GFD) 
database and utilizes equation (1) to measure the degree of hedging. Data is monthly and the sample 
spans 1973 to 2004 for 11 developed and 17 emerging market countries. Equation (1) is rewritten below 
for convenience, 
( ) tiii RateExchangeWeightedRBillTIndexbankMarketnonRateBillTIndexSectorBanking εβββ +Δ+−−Δ+=−Δ ,2,1,0 .%% 16  (4) 
where the change in the aggregate banking sector stock market index is over the previous month, the 
annual treasury bill rate is converted to a monthly rate and the exchange rate is again an equally 
weighted average of Dollar, Pound and Yen’s domestic currency values. 
The results are illustrated in table 3b. Similar to the first experiment emerging market countries tend to 
be negatively affected from their foreign exchange exposures while the developed countries in general 
are not. While there were 2 out of 11 developed countries with significant 2β  coefficients, there were 10 
out of 17 emerging market countries for the 1973-2004 period. It should also be pointed out that while 
all of the emerging market countries during this period had negative coefficients implying a reduction in 
the firm’s market value as the result of depreciations, 5 out of the 11 developed countries had positive 
coefficients.  
Another observation is that the detrimental effects of foreign currency exposure was mainly observed 
after 1994 for both emerging market and developed countries. While S. Africa was the only country with 
a significant coefficient before 1994, every emerging market country except for Korea had a significant 
coefficient after 1994. The insignificant coefficients for the US and UK are in line with the previous 
literature but the significant coefficients for Japan and Canada are different from the previous research. 
The reason for the difference might stem from the consideration of banking sector as a whole as opposed 
to considering individual firms.  
4. Balance Sheet Effects, Exchange Rate Regimes and the Real Sector 
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16 Similar to the previous experiment, I used the lags of the non-bank market index variable and obtained similar results. 
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The previous sections provided some evidence suggesting that foreign finance costs that an emerging 
market country faces depends on the strength of its banking sector balance sheets and that these banks 
are relatively unhedged in terms of their foreign currency exposures. 
 This section utilizes these findings to analyze the implications of different exchange rate regimes on 
the real economy that faces external finance shocks within the framework of balance sheet effects. 
Different from the existing empirical literature the approach proposed uses the EMBI instead of a 
weighted average of foreign interest rates as a measure of external finance cost.  This approach allows 
foreign interest rates to be affected by domestic economy variables in addition to their exogenously 
determined component.  
Theory provides two explanations for the relationship between exchange rate regimes and output 
volatility when the economy is faced with unexpected changes in foreign interest rates or capital flows. 
The first one pertains to the observation that the monetary authority has to match the change in foreign 
rates under fixed regimes which exacerbates the effect of the original shock and under flexible regimes 
part of the necessary adjustment is absorbed by exchange rates which in turn limits output volatility. The 
second explanation is related to balance sheet effects and implies that flexible regimes may add a source 
of volatility to the system by affecting the country’s net foreign liabilities. More specifically, exchange 
rate depreciations following external shocks can deteriorate the strength of balance sheets by inflating 
the domestic currency value of foreign currency liabilities.  
The latter explanation has attracted more attention after the increasing number of crises originating 
from problems in the banking sector and the abrupt outflows of capital in the 90’s. Although currency 
mismatches have been analyzed intensively on theoretical grounds, empirical evidence is scarce. 
 In this context, this section tries to determine if the balance sheet effects are strong enough to overturn 
the conventional wisdom or the first explanation. I use three different methods in my analysis. First, 
quarterly data is employed in a PSVAR model to obtain impulse responses. In this framework, I also use 
a weighted average of foreign interest rates instead of the EMBI, following the literature, and compare 
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the results.  Finally, I consider the unsystematic volatility in the exchange rates in measuring the 
response of output under different exchange rate regimes using a SVAR-GARCH method. Second, I use 
monthly country specific data to compare the performance of different exchange rate regimes. Third, I 
check the robustness of the results to a different method of measuring impulse responses. 
4.1 Related Literature 
Recently the consensus in the limited empirical literature studying the effects of exchange rate regimes 
on real sector variables is that output is more volatile under fixed regimes. The recurring explanation for 
higher volatility in these papers is the inability of central banks to respond to external shocks.  
Similar to the methodology followed in this paper, Hoffman (2003) conducts a PSVAR analysis for 
the 1973 – 1999 period on emerging market countries to test the performance of different exchange rate 
regimes using de facto and de jure classification. He identifies structural innovations by assuming that 
foreign interest rates and foreign output is exogenous to the system and finds that under both 
classifications flexible regimes outperform pegged regimes in terms of output volatility.   
Using a different approach Hochreiter, Korinek and Siklos (2003) study the performance of different 
Taylor rules for Austria, Netherlands, Canada and New Zealand to determine if joining a monetary 
union is or was the appropriate choice. The authors argue that using a Taylor rule that is exogenous to 
the system of equations does not violate the Lucas Critique since the imposition of a Taylor rule 
incorporating a fixed exchange rate regime implies that, other structural shocks hit the economy to 
sustain the policy rule. 
I do not use this identification scheme due to data limitations and instead separate countries in terms of 
their exchange rate volatility in to two groups and compare the impulse responses of these two groups as 
explained in detail below. Bergvall (2005) similarly finds evidence for greater output volatility under 
fixed regimes for Sweden is faced with fiscal and monetary policy shock. The author uses a small open 
economy model for identification purposes. The foreign interest rate is exogenous. 
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Using a regression analysis LevyYeyati-Sturzenegger (2003) find that under fixed exchange rate 
regimes, output volatility is higher and output growth is lower. The authors capture the effect of the 
regimes by adding dummy variables and using a de facto classification for the exchange rate regime.  
Irresponsive of these findings pointing to higher output volatility with flexible regimes developing 
countries limit their exchange rate movements. Calvo and Reinhart’s research (2000) which analyzes 
154 exchange rate arrangements has shown that countries that announce a floating regime do not de 
facto float their currency. The approach in this section again allows foreign interest rates to be 
endogenously determined and offers a possible explanation for the fear of floating. 
4.2 Data 
There are two limitations encountered in the data set for emerging market economies. First, EMBI data 
for these countries was only available after 1998 and is unbalanced. Second, real sector data for some of 
the countries is only available annually. I employ two methods taking into account these limitations. 
First, I use a PSVAR model using a data set comprised of quarterly observations between 1998 and 2004 
for the 13 emerging market countries listed in appendix 4. The reason for using a panel model is again 
the unavailability of long time series. 
Next, motivated by the findings in part 2 that there is a positive relationship between net foreign 
liabilities of the domestic banks and the external finance cost of countries,  net foreign liabilities is 
utilized as a proxy for EMBI. This convention allows me to use a longer time series and perform country 
specific analysis. In this respect, I use monthly data from 1980 to 2004 for the countries listed in 
appendix 4 in a SVAR model.  
4.3 Methodology and Results 
4.3.1 PSVAR 
4.3.1.1 PSVAR with EMBI 
The first experiment uses a de facto classification to determine the countries that have followed a 
relatively tight and a flexible exchange rate policy during the time period 1998 to 2004. Appendix 4 lists 
the countries in the two groups. Data corresponding to the crisis periods of Russia, Brazil, Turkey and 
Argentina are excluded from the analysis for these countries. 
I construct a PSVAR for the two groups of countries and obtain impulse responses to foreign interest 
rate shocks. I assume that the economy is described by the following structural form equation, 
( ) tt uyL =Φ                                        (5) 
( )LΦ  is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L,  are serially uncorrelated structural disturbances 
and . The structural form parameters are recovered from the reduced form equation, 
tu
( ) ttu Ω=var
( ) ttt eeffectsfixedcountryyLy ++Ψ=                               (6) 
where  is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L and ( )LΨ ( ) tte Σ=var . Different from the usual 
reduced from estimation country fixed effects are also included to control for omitted variables that 
change across entities. Reduced form variance covariance matrix tΣ  can be decomposed as follows, 
'1
0
1
0
−− Ω=Σ AAt                                 (7) 
where reduced form and structural form disturbances are related by, 
tt eAu 0=                             (8) 
Finding  allows us to obtain impulse response functions from the following moving average 
representation, 
0A
.....22110 +++= −− tttt uAuAuAy                              (9) 
where represents the impulse response functions and can be found using the matrix 
and reduced form coefficients.  
∞= tojAj 1 0A
To identify the structural disturbances n x (n-1)/2 restrictions have to be imposed on the matrix. 
The two commonly used methods are imposing short run restrictions on the contemporaneous 
relationship matrix and using Blanchard Quah (1989) procedure to impose long run restrictions.  
0A
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In the model employed, the data vector y is {GDP, CPI, E, EMBI, R}17, where E is the weighted 
exchange rate, and R is the domestic quarterly lending rate and EMBI is used as a proxy for foreign 
interest rates. All the variables except the interest rate are log differenced due to the existence of unit 
roots. 
For identification, I use Blanchard Quah long run restrictions since it is reasonable to assume that the 
variables in the system respond to disturbances in other variables within a quarter. More specifically, I 
restrict the matrix of long run responses to be lower triangular and thereby assume that GDP growth is 
not affected by the other variables, and monetary disturbances do not affect inflation, EMBI and the 
exchange rate in the long run. Hence the elements of the matrix can be recovered from the following 
restrictions. 
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The responses to a 1 standard deviation shock in EMBI are displayed in figure 2a. There are three 
important observations. First, contrary to the literature, the impulse responses point to higher output 
volatility under flexible regimes. Second, under fixed regimes central banks have not responded as 
aggressively as they have under flexible regimes. Finally, the response of EMBI under flexible regimes 
is much higher than with fixed regimes. These findings point to the significance of the destabilizing 
affect of foreign creditor perception towards a country and to the fact that more controlled regimes were 
better equipped with sustaining external shocks after 1998 in emerging market countries.  
4.3.1.2 PSVAR with Foreign Interest Rates 
This section uses an equally weighted average of the lending rates of U.S., U.K. and Japan instead of 
the EMBI in the PSVAR model outlined above. The results are illustrated on figure 2b and point to the 
lack of evidence in favor of either of the two exchange rate regimes in terms of output volatility.  More 
 17
                                                 
17 The results were mostly robust to the different orderings I tried. 
specifically change in output and interest rates in response to foreign interest rate shocks are much 
smaller compared to the responses in the model including EMBI18. 
This result, together with the findings in part 2 implies that the domestic economy is more sensitive to 
external shocks that are in turn related to fundamental variables of the economy than shocks involving 
developments in advanced countries.  
4.3.1.3 SVAR-GARCH 
To measure the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on the economy under different regimes, I identify 
the unsystematic component of the exchange rate using the PSVAR model explained above. Next, I fit a 
GARCH(1,1) model to exchange rate volatility to obtain the conditional standard deviation series as  
( ) ttustt νσβεββσ +++ = −− 2 1221102                                                                                      (10) 
us
t 1−ε is the Cholesky orthogonalized exchange rate shock and is the unconditional exchange rate 
variance. Finally, I include the conditional standard deviation of the exchange rate 
2
tσ
tσˆ obtained from the 
estimation of (10) in the PSVAR model such that the data vector y includes { tσˆ ,GDP,CPI, E,EMBI, R}. 
The impulse responses are displayed in figure 2c. Results show that with flexible regimes, responses 
are larger in amplitude compared with the PSVAR model above, and that under fixed regimes the drop 
in output is mitigated. This observation implies that with greater uncertainty, risk premiums associated 
with exchange rates are more sensitive to external shocks and that these uncertainties are greater with 
more flexible regimes. 
4.3.2 Country Specific Analysis (Monthly Data) 
Although country fixed effects are included in the previous section, panel model results can still be 
driven by few countries. In this part, I analyze different exchange rate regimes for different countries by 
separating periods with low and high exchange rate volatility, and fitting a VAR model to each period to 
obtain impulse responses to foreign interest rate shocks. 
                                                 
 18
18 These results are not sensitive to different weighting schemes. Weights favoring U.S., U.K. and Japan interest rates and weights based on 
the proximity of the emerging market economies to these countries have yielded similar results. 
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Figure 3 shows the percent change in exchange rates over the last month for 11 emerging market 
countries. For Colombia, Korea, Peru, Malaysia and Mexico the shifts in exchange rate volatility are 
evident while for the other countries they are not as clear.  
The variables employed are the same as in the previous section except for EMBI and GDP. The 
measure for foreign interest rates EMBI is only available for the 1998-2004 period.  The length of this 
period is insufficient to execute a country specific analysis hence I utilize Net Foreign Liabilities / 
Assets ratio of deposit banks as a proxy for foreign interest rates based on the findings in section 2 that 
there is positive relationship between these two variables.   
Instead of GDP, I use the monthly industrial production index. Number of observations under fixed 
exchange rate periods is adjusted to be close to that under flexible regimes to attain a similar degree of 
efficiency under the two estimations. Finally, exchange rate fluctuations that are 3 standard deviations 
higher or lower than the mean fluctuation are excluded from the analysis to avoid a bias against flexible 
regimes. Hence, crises periods stemming from or resulting in large depreciations are excluded.  
Due to these adjustments and data unavailability, the analysis is limited to the 1980:01 - 2004:12 
period, and the country set is reduced to, {Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia}.  
For identification, cholesky decomposition is utilized with the following ordering {Output, CPI, 
NFLDB, R, E}, where output denotes industrial production, NFLDB is net foreign liabilities to assets 
ratio of the deposit banks and every variable is log differenced except for interest rates and NFLDB. 
This ordering is consistent with Kim and Roubini (2000) and implies that output and CPI are not 
affected contemporaneously by the shocks to the other variables in the system and that exchange rates 
respond within the same period to shocks to every other variable. 
Results are displayed in figures 4 and 5. There are four important observations. First, the impulse 
responses are qualitatively similar to the responses from the panel model. Second, contrary to common 
wisdom the change in output is lower under fixed regimes except for Mexico. Third, central banks 
respond more aggressively to foreign interest rate shocks under flexible regimes. Finally, foreign 
creditor perception of country risk reflected in NFLDB increases by a greater amount under flexible 
regimes in response to a shock to itself except for Mexico and Brazil. 
These results again imply that as currencies depreciate in response to foreign interest rate shocks 
foreign interest rates increase further due to a deterioration of foreign creditors’ perception. Hence, 
central banks adjust interest rates further due to this effect and the decline in output is exacerbated and 
these effects are greater in amplitude under flexible regimes.  
The results imply that as the currency depreciates, emerging market banks with foreign currency open 
positions face deteriorating balance sheets and foreign creditors adjust their interest rates or there is a 
capital outflow which in turn forces central banks to adjust interest rates and depress economic activity. 
4.3.3 Local Projections (Monthly Panel Data) 
Structural VAR methods have been put under scrutiny by recent research.  According to this literature 
two of the important short comings of these methods are that the misspecifications of VARs are large 
enough that they can lead to mistaken inferences and VARs which are designed to execute one period 
ahead forecasts, are subject to compounding misspecification errors with the forecast horizon. The latter 
shortcoming poses a problem for impulse responses which are functions of forecasts at distant horizons.  
In this respect, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) show that impulse responses using artificial data 
from a simple RBC model contradict the responses from the model itself.  The authors argue that this 
misspecification stems from the inability of specifications involving few lags to capture the persistence 
in model data that come from the low rate of depreciation of capital.  
Jorda (2004), proposes an alternative method for calculating impulse responses that is robust to the 
misspecification of the data generating process and uses projections local to each forecast horizon. More 
specifically, the following equation is estimated for each forecast horizon to obtain impulse responses, 
hsuyyyy s stpt
s
pt
s
t
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2
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1
1 =+++++= +−+−+−++ βββα                     (11) 
where h denotes the maximum forecast horizon, y is {Output, CPI,  EMBI, R, E} and output denotes 
industrial production. Optimal p is determined at each horizon using the Akaike Information Criterion. 
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The impulse responses corresponding to equation (10) are calculated from, 
hsddstIR ii ,.....,2,1,0ˆ),,( 1 == β                 (12) 
where  represents the structural shock to the iid
th element in y and corresponds to the ith  column of the 
D matrix obtained from the cholesky decomposition of the variance covariance matrix  of the reduced 
form, Ω  as follows: 
1' −==Ω PDandPP  
In this section, I use monthly panel data from the 1998-2004 period to obtain impulse responses via 
local projections. The reasons for using this period and estimating a panel model are to avoid using a 
proxy for the EMBI variable and insufficient data respectively. I seperate the countries in the data set 
into two groups similar to the strategy followed in section 4.3.1. The countries which had relatively 
fixed and flexible regimes within the period are tabulated in appendix 4.  
The results are displayed in figure 6, and are consistent with the representations in the previous two 
sections. In this respect, I observe a larger hike in interest rates and EMBI, and a higher drop in 
industrial production under flexible regimes in response to a positive foreign interest rate shock.   
5.  Conclusion 
Current empirical and theoretical literature emphasizes the advantage of flexible regimes over fixed 
regimes in terms of output stability when a small open economy faces external shocks. This advantage 
stems from the involuntary adjustment of domestic interest rates that exacerbate the effect of the shock 
under fixed regimes. 
This paper finds evidence that supports a relationship between bank leverage and foreign interest rates 
in emerging markets, and hence provides a case against the exogenous foreign interest rate assumption 
under small open economy models.  
 VAR methods show how the conclusions of the literature can be reversed when I allow for this 
contemporaneous relationship between foreign interest rates and bank balance sheets. More specifically, 
exchange rate regimes that limit the effect of external shocks on bank balance sheets and hence on 
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foreign interest rates are better coped with limiting output volatility in markets that are not hedged in 
terms of foreign currency.  
This analysis can be extended by including the endogenous relationship between foreign interest rates 
and bank balance sheets in a theoretical model and comparing the results with exogenous foreign 
interest rates case. In this respect it would be interesting to check the robustness of the identification 
scheme in this paper by using the cross equation restrictions from such a model obtained by maximum 
likelihood or Bayesian methods. 
Finally except for the Chang and Velasco type models, empirical and theoretical literature on maturity 
mismatches and the implications for monetary policy in emerging markets is very scarce at this point. I 
find this surprising since maturity mismatches have played a crucial role in currency crises together with 
currency mismatches. 
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Appendix 1:  
Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, S. Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela 
Credit Rating Definitions: 
The following definitions are the same for foreign currency and domestic currency credit ratings: 
Log Term Issuer Credit Ratings: 
The following ratings also have plus or minus signs to show the relative standing within the major 
categories. Together with the plus and minus definitions there are 29 categories.  
AAA: The obligor has extremely strong capacity its meet their financial commitments. 
AA: The obligor has very strong capacity its meet their financial commitments. 
A: The obligor has strong capacity its meet their financial commitments. 
BBB: The obligor has adequate capacity its meet their financial commitments. 
BB: The obligor is less vulnerable in the near term than other lower rated obligors. However it faces 
major ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse business that could lead to an inadequate capacity 
to meet it’s commitments. 
B: The obligor is more vulnerable in the obligors rated BB, but the obligor has the capacity to meet its 
financial commitments. Ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse business will likely impair the 
obligor’s capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments. 
CCC: The obligor is currently vulnerable and is dependent upon favorable business, financial or 
economic conditions to meet its financial commitments. 
CC: The obligor is currently highly vulnerable.  
D, SD: Default 
Short Term Ratings: 
The following show the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments. There a total of 8 
categories. 
A-1+: Extremely Strong  
A-1: Strong 
A-2: Satisfactory. Obligor is more susceptible to adverse effects. 
A-3: Adequate. Adverse effects will most likely lead to weakened capacity. 
B: Vulnerable. There are major ongoing uncertainties.  
C: Currently Vulnerable.  Meeting commitments depend on favorable economic conditions. 
D, SD: Default 
Appendix 2:  
Inflation(*): Annual change in CPI. 
Reserves(*): Central Bank foreign currency and gold reserves. 
Global Emerging Market Bond Index: Weighted average spread of all the emerging market country 
bond indices also reported by JP Morgan. 
Current Account/GDP(*):Current Account Deficit is originally in dollars. This variable is converted to 
local currency and then divided by GDP. 
Budget Deficit/GDP(*): Consolidated budget deficit divided by GDP. 
Net Foreign Liabilities(*): Foreign liabilities net of foreign assets for domestic deposit banks. 
Net Worth (*): Capital Accounts(**) of domestic deposit banks.  
(*)   Source IFS 
(**) Total assets minus total liabilities. 
Appendix 3:  
Emerging Market Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, 
Poland, S.Africa, Turkey  
Developed Countries:  Australia, Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, UK, US  
Variables:  
Net Worth: Referred to as Capital Accounts in IFS. If not available, equals Bank Assets-Bank Liabilities.  
Banking Sector Control Variables 
Banking Sector Claim on Gov. Assets: Claims on the central government and other levels of government 
including the social security system. 
Claim on Private Assets: Comprised mostly of domestic credit 
Net Foreign Liability/Assets: Measures foreign currency open position: (Foreign Liabilities - Foreign 
Assets)/Assets. 
Liquidity: Bank Reserves/Assets         
Macroeconomic Control Variables 
GDP Growth:   Change in real GDP, Base year: 2000       
Inflation: Quarterly change in the CPI index. 
Dependent Variable 
Rate of Return on Bank Assets:  ( )( )
)1(
1
−
−−
Assets
NetWorthNetWorth      
Period: 1998:1 to 2004:4         
Source: IFS 
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Appendix 4: 
      Quarterly Panel Countries:    Period: 1998:1 – 2004:2 Quarterly 
Relatively Fixed E-R   
   
Standard Deviation(E-R) / 
Average(E-R) 
  Ukraine 1.44 
  South Africa 1.48 
  Ecuador 1.80 
  Colombia 1.82 
  Russia 2.50 
  Brazil 2.81 
  Philippines 2.87 
Relatively Flexible E-R   
  Poland 2.90 
  Mexico 3.28 
  Argentina 3.96 
  Turkey 8.47 
  Bulgaria 9.04 
  Malaysia 9.38 
 
 
 
 
Local Projections Monthly Panel Model Countries: 
Period: 1998:1 - 2004:12 Monthly 
Relatively Fixed E-R   
   
Standard Deviation(E-R) / 
Average(E-R) 
 Brazil  0.086556 
 Bulgaria 0.02376 
 Colombia 0.085313 
 Philippines 0.060625 
 Turkey 0.078727 
Relatively Flexible E-R   
  Korea  0.312762 
  Malaysia 0.120951 
  Mexico 0.219923 
  Peru 0.134252 
  Poland 0.524909 
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Figure 2a: Panel Model Response to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock (EMBI, Quarterly Data) 
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Figure 2b: Response to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock (Developed Country Lending Rates) 
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Figure 2c: Panel Response to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock (SVAR-GARCH, Quarterly Data) 
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Figure 3: % Change in Exchange Rates 
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a 1% Positive Shock to Net Foreign Liabilities (Monthly Data) 
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Figure 5: Response of Foreign Liabilities to a Foreign Liability Shock (Monthly Data) 
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Figure 6: Local Projections Impulse Responses to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock (Monthly Data) 
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Table1 *           
            
    
%Change in 
Exchange Rate   Leverage   GDP Growth 
 Indonesia   29.4    31.1    -3.4  
  Korea   23.3    9.4    -8.3  
 Malaysia   12.4    61.9    -4.5  
Asian Crisis Philippines   14.6    -10.7    0.1  
  Singapore   4.2    23.1    -1.2  
  Thailand   25.8    136.3    -9.6  
  Vietnam   5.8    -92.7    7.3  
  Argentina   0.0    40.0    -3.0  
  Chile   -5.6    48.8    10.3  
1994 Ecuador   16.7    37.7    -11.5  
Peso Crisis Mexico   89.9    -30.7    -4.2  
  Panama   0.0    -134.0    1.2  
  Peru   2.3    -23.3    10.3  
  Uruguay   26.0    -412.6    3.0  
  Argentina   0.0    37.6    -4.0  
1998 Chile   10.5    12.6    -1.6  
Russian Default Colombia   23.2    42.9    -2.7  
Mexico   4.6    -155.1    2.4  
Panama   0.0    -101.4    3.5  
plus Brazil 
abandoning the 
band Peru   15.4    7.3    1.3  
  Russia   153.6    26.5    -12.1  
  Uruguay   8.3    -283.0    3.2  
2001 Turkey Turkey   96.0    41.1    -7.2  
2002 Argentina Argentina   206.0     122.1     -7.6  
* % changes are over the year before and after the crisis 
 
 Table 2a: EMBI and Leverage 
  EMBI (1)   EMBI (Fixed Effects) 
  Coefficients t-stat  Coefficients t-stat
Control Variables    
Inflation 14.46 4.1  12.57 3.4
CB Reserves -31.38 -3.0  -7.64 -1.9
Global EMBI 0.13 2.6  0.15 1.6
EMBI(-1) 0.94 22.3  0.91 20.8
EMBI(-2) -0.52 -6.3  -0.52 -6.1
EMBI(-3) 0.26 4.4  0.24 3.7
Current Account/GDP  909.7 2.3  731.9 1.7
Budget Deficit/GDP  305.4 1.3  331.7 1.0
Leverage      
Net Foreign Liabilities/GDP(-1) 298.7 2.3  490.2 1.9
Net Worth/GDP (-1) -129.8 -1.8  -521.6 -2.0
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.9371   0.9370  
Total Observations 298     299   
(1) Cross Section weights are used in the variance covariance matrix   
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Table 2b: S&P Foreign Currency Credit Rating(1)  
  Short Term   Long Term 
        
  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat
Control Variables     
Inflation 0.01 1.0  0.0157 3.97
CB Reserves 0.0001 0.8  0.0157 1.72
Global EMBI 0.0012 12.8  0.0023 45.11
SP(-1) -0.0003 -2.0  -0.0005 -5.91
SP(-2) -0.0001 -0.4  -0.0002 -2.21
SP(-3) 0.0002 1.5  0.0005 6.39
Current Account/GDP -0.8435 -1.1  -1.2727 -3.03
Budget Deficit/GDP -0.1 -0.3  -0.2252 -0.88
        
Leverage       
Net Foreign Liabilities/GDP (-1) -0.40 -1.70  -0.45 -3.72
Net Worth/GDP (-1) 0.45 3.36  1.00 13.86
        
Adjusted R-squared       
        
Total Observations 287     287   
(1) Count Data Model is employed      
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2c:S&P Domestic Currency Credit Rating(1)  
  Short Term   Long Term 
  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat
Control Variables     
Inflation 0.00 0.1  0.0142 3.18
CB Reserves 0.0121 0.7  0.0230 2.65
Global EMBI 0.0015 15.4  0.0024 48.10
SP(-1) -0.0004 -2.5  -0.0005 -5.45
SP(-2) 0.0001 0.5  -0.0001 -1.13
SP(-3) 0.0001 0.6  0.0005 5.82
Current Account/GDP -0.3285 -0.3  -1.0190 -2.45
Budget Deficit/GDP 0.0 0.0  -0.0299 -0.12
        
Leverage       
Net Foreign Liabilities/GDP (-1) -0.47 -2.00  -0.33 -2.84
Net Worth/GDP (-1) 0.64 4.05  1.03 14.72
        
Adjusted R-squared       
Total Observations 251     268   
(1) Count Data Model is employed      
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Table 3a: Relationship Between Exchange Rate Movements and Rate of Return on Bank Assets 
Dependent Variable: Rate of Return on Bank Assets, Method: Fixed Effects, 2-Step FGLS Regression  
  Emerging Markets  Developed 
  Coefficient t-stat p-value  Coefficient t-stat p-value 
Control Variables         
Inflation 0.0003 17.17 0.000  0.0002 0.40 0.692 
Inflation(-1) -0.0004 -10.63 0.000  0.0001 0.12 0.907 
GDP Growth(-1) 0.0003 8.68 0.000  0.0003 1.01 0.312 
Liquidity -0.1745 -1.91 0.057  -0.3190 -1.62 0.106 
Liquidity(-1) 0.1708 1.99 0.048  0.3541 1.75 0.081 
Banks' Claim on Government Assets -0.0099 -0.27 0.786  -0.0095 -1.16 0.246 
Banks' Claim on Private Assets 0.0005 1.68 0.094  0.0001 0.88 0.378 
Bank Net Foreign Liabilities / Assets -0.0067 -0.20 0.842  0.0035 0.45 0.651 
AR(1) -0.0118 -0.18 0.854  -0.1395 -2.45 0.015 
AR(2) -0.0995 -2.00 0.047  -0.1558 -3.17 0.002 
Change in Exchange Rate -0.0671 -6.28 0.000  0.0029 0.19 0.847 
Number of Observations  460    406   
Adjusted R_Squared   0.59       0.10   
 
Table 3b:Foreign Exchange Exposure: Evidence From Stock Returns(*) 
    1973 --- 2004     1973 --- 1994     1994 --- 2004 
  Coeff. t-stat p-value   Coeff. t-stat p-value   Coeff. t-stat p-value 
Developed      
Australia -0.21 -0.96 0.34  -0.22 -1.43 0.15  -0.32 -2.07 0.04 
Canada -0.27 -1.59 0.11  -0.33 -1.18 0.24  -0.52 -2.72 0.01 
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 1.00          
Denmark -0.17 0.25 0.49          
Iceland 0.23 1.09 0.28          
Israel -0.15 -1.48 0.14  -0.22 -1.19 0.24  -0.39 -2.65 0.01 
Japan -0.58 -3.03 0.00  -0.41 -0.94 0.35  -0.57 -2.93 0.00 
Singapore -1.47 -5.14 0.00  -0.11 -0.47 0.64  -2.28 -4.87 0.00 
Sweden 0.08 0.54 0.59  0.08 0.57 0.57  0.00 0.01 0.99 
UK 0.10 0.97 0.33  -0.02 -0.23 0.82  0.15 0.89 0.38 
US 0.21 1.00 0.32  -0.01 -0.23 0.82  0.22 1.01 0.32 
Emerging Markets     
Chile -0.37 -1.34 0.19          
China -0.35 -1.67 0.10          
Ecuador -0.36 0.42 0.39          
Egypt 0.00 -0.03 0.98          
Indonesia -0.16 -2.86 0.00  -0.57 -0.26 0.80  -0.16 -3.73 0.00 
Korea -0.35 -1.98 0.05  -0.43 -1.12 0.27  -0.34 -1.62 0.11 
Malaysia -0.47 -4.61 0.00  0.33 1.39 0.16  -0.58 -5.64 0.00 
Mexico -0.07 -1.49 0.14          
Morocco -0.21 -1.73 0.09  0.04 0.59 0.55  -0.49 -1.86 0.07 
Peru -1.34 -0.63 0.53  -1.53 -0.29 0.77  -0.20 -5.94 0.00 
Phillipines -0.81 -5.10 0.00          
Poland -0.16 -0.89 0.38          
Russia -0.25 -1.79 0.08          
S.Africa -0.35 -4.15 0.00  -0.27 -2.16 0.03  -0.48 -4.26 0.00 
Thailand -0.23 -2.10 0.04  0.10 0.68 0.50  -0.26 -1.71 0.09 
Turkey -0.25 -2.00 0.05          
Venezuela -0.05 -1.50 0.14   -0.01 -0.41 0.68   -0.12 -1.95 0.05 
2/11 0/8   5/8Ratio of Developed Countries with a 
significant coefficient(**)           
10/17    1/8    7/8 Ratio of Emerg. Mar. Countries with 
a significant coeff.(**)       
(*)Source: Global Financial Data and IFS (**) Significant with 10% confidence   
 
